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Taking a left libertarian account of distributive justice, Steiner argues for a basic income funded by a
tax on land. In this essay, I argue along similar lines for a basic income funded by a tax on the involuntary
drawing of attention. I first argue that the involuntary drawing of a person’s attention denies them their
liberty to direct their attention. I then show that attention is a production factor in some modern work,
taking the paradigm case of advertising. With these premises, I conclude that when attention is a produc-
tion factor, part of the product is owed to those whose attention was drawn — and extend this to argue for
a universal basic income, funded by work which takes involuntary attention as a production factor, and is
situated in public spaces.
1 Compensation for Liberty Lost
In this essay, I explore an interesting implication of le libertarianism. Le libertar-
ianism is a theory of distributive justice: it makes claims about how benets and burdens
should be distributed across members of society.1 Le libertarianism is a variety of liber-
tarianism so, just like the more familiar right libertarianism, it grounds justice in moral
(as opposed to legal) property rights. Le and right libertarians both take self-ownership as
a fundamental moral right. Our bodies are our own property, and therefore, the fruits of
our labour are also ourproperty. But natural resources are the fruits of nobody’s labour, so
who’s property are they? This is where le and right libertarianism come apart. Right lib-
ertarians say that the rst individual to claim or mix their labour with a natural resource
‘appropriates’ it, making it their property. Le libertarians radically disagree, arguing it
does not matter who gets there rst, natural resources are owned equally by all — they
are our collective natural inheritance.
For the purposes of this essay, let’s assume a le libertarian account of distributive
justice. As self-owners, we own the fruits of our labour. However, as Steiner argues, for
our labour to generate value, some other things are required, which Steiner calls produc-
tion factors.2 While the nature of these production factors varies between kinds of labour,
in many cases, the ultimate antecedents of them are natural resources and the land con-
taining them. Therefore, though we own the portion of our product which is due to our
1Vallentyne, Peter, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka. "Why le-libertarianism is not incoherent, indeterminate, or irrelevant: A
reply to Fried." Philosophy & Public Aairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 201-215.
2Steiner, Hillell. "Compensation for liberty lost: Le libertarianism and unconditional basic income." Juncture 22, no. 4 (2016):
293-295.
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self-owned labour, there is oen another portionwhich is due to natural resources, which
are owned equally by all. Therefore, when any individual uses an area of land, they deny
everyone else their equal liberty to use it. As a result, they owe everyone else compen-
sation for this liberty denied — which Steiner argues could be levied in the form of a tax
upon land and natural resources which is paid to all as a universal basic income.
In this essay, I make an argument among similar lines: on a le libertarian ac-
count of distributive justice, the involuntary drawing of attention is liberty denied. Thus,
when human attention is used as a production factor, part of the product is owed to those
whose attention was drawn.
2 Involuntary Attention as Liberty Lost
My argument relies on two properties of human attention. The rst is that attention is
scarce. Selectivity is a central property of attention: Mole describes attention as “the
selective directedness of ourmental lives”.3 Some accounts of attention take its selectivity
to be due to limitations in the brain’s capacity to process complex properties of multiple
stimuli.4 Meanwhile, other theories take selectivity to be the management of an excess
in brain capacity.5 For this essay, this discussion does not need to be resolved — both
views are compatible withmy argument. Both approaches take attention to be inherently
selective — the amount of information that can be attended to is limited, and attention is
a scarce resource.
The second property of attention that my argument rests on is that attention can
be voluntarily directed by the subject, or involuntarily drawn by some external factor.
This distinction is supported by the psychological literature — for example, Eimer et al.
dene involuntary attention as “processes of attending that are not elicited by intentions
but by certain outside events”.6 When a subject voluntarily directs their attention, this is
an exercise of their self-ownership — they freely direct their own powers of perception
and action. So, I argue for a liberty to direct one’s own attention. Additionally, voluntary
direction of attention is a fundamental prerequisite for the exercise of well-established
liberties, such as freedom of speech. To speak freely, the speaker must attend to the con-
tent of the utterance, and voluntarily perform the speech act.
Given that attention is scarce, when a portion of a subject’s attention is involun-
tarily drawn by something, this restricts the extent to which it can be voluntarily directed
to other things.7 Therefore, involuntary drawing of a subject’s attention restricts their
liberty to direct their attention, and thereby denies other liberties that depend upon this.
3Mole, Christopher, "Attention". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2017 Edition (2017), 1.
4See Broadbent (1958), Deutsch (1963).
5See Friston et al. (2006), Neisser (2014).
6Eimer, Martin, Dieter Nattkemper, Erich Schröger, and Wolfgang Prinz. "Involuntary attention." In Handbook of Perception and
Action, vol. 3. Elsevier Academic Press, 1996, 155.
7This claim is empirically supported, such as in Jonides (1981).
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3 Attention as a Production Factor
Steiner’s argument for a tax on land rests on landbeing anultimate antecedent production
factor in forms of work— in these forms of production, the producer owes compensation
to everyone else for using land which is everyone’s common inheritance. However, in
somemodern forms of work, very little land and natural resources are needed as produc-
tion factors. Take the case of advertising — for concreteness, a billboard erected beside
a motorway. The designer of the advertisement, as a self-owner, owns the fruits of their
labour. This is not the total product, however, because a small amount of materials for
the signage are a production factor, as is the small plot of land upon which it stands. Far
more signicant a production factor than these, though, is human attention. No matter
how much labour the designer pours into the sign, or how much land and resource is
used in its erection, it produces nothing if human attention is not drawn by it. Indeed,
its product is roughly proportional to the amount of human attention drawn by it,8 just
as, for Steiner’s argument, a coal extraction plant’s product is roughly proportional to the
amount of coal present in the seam it is built upon. Thus I argue that a signicant pro-
duction factor in advertising work is human attention.
In some cases, people pay attention to an advertisement voluntarily. In many
other cases, however, attention is involuntarily drawn by an advertisement— indeed, this
is oen an explicit goal of marketing designers. Advertisements which employ bright
colours, motion, large text, and evocative imagery exploit involuntary attentional pro-
cesses which automatically direct attention to visual objects with these properties.
4 Basic Income Funded by an Attention Tax
Taking the claims justied thus far, we can now construct the central argument. When a
person A uses the involuntary attention of person B as a production factor, A denies B’s
liberty to direct their attention freely. Therefore, A owes B compensation. Aer Steiner9,
we can apply the Kantian ends-means injunction – this denial of liberty is unjustied, as A
uses B’s attention as ameans to the end ofmaking a product, so does not treat B as an end
in themselves. The material basis of the required compensation is conveniently appar-
ent and calculable: B owns that proportion of the product which B’s role as a production
factor contributed. As a self-owner, products that are made with B as a production factor
are owned by B to the extent that B contributed to the production. This is analogous to
Steiner’s land case — Steiner argues we should have a 100% tax on the portion of products
that are due to natural resources and land, manifested as a 100% tax on the natural value
of land, excluding any constructions built upon it.
I now expand this specic one-to-one argument for compensation for attentional
8The product is not directly proportional, because advertisements may be targeting specic audiences – an advertisement for
wedding photographers may generate no additional product if more people who are not planning a wedding attend to it.
9Steiner, Hillel. "Silver spoons and golden genes: Talent dierentials and distributive justice." In The Moral and Political Status of
Children, 186. Oxford University Press, 2002
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liberty lost, to a one-to-many basic income argument along the same lines. Take the
case where A uses human involuntary attention as a production factor and situates their
attention-drawing object in a public place. This could take the form of a ashing bill-
board displaying an advertisement visible from a public place, such as a town square. In
this case, A denies the liberty of all people to enter that public place without their atten-
tion being involuntarily drawn, and used as a production factor — so used as a means to
A’s productive ends, not as an end in themselves. In cases like this, A owes compensation
to everyone for liberty lost, because all people are denied the liberty to enter this public
place without their attention being involuntarily drawn. Compensation owed to every-
one can be paid in the form of a basic income. A should pay into the basic income fund
an amount proportional to the degree to which the attention-drawing object involuntar-
ily draws attention, multiplied by the duration over which the attention-drawing object
is situated in public. This sets the level of compensation paid depending upon the total
amount of liberty denied by A.
5 Objections and Replies
A rst concern with the above argument might be that we have denied A, as a self-owner,
ownership of their ownproduct— aer all, they contributed labour, so they own the fruits
of their labour. This worry is taken care of by the method of calculating the compensa-
tion owed by A. In the one-to-one case, A owes B the proportion of the product which is
due to B’s involuntary attention as a production factor. This is clearly not the entire prod-
uct, because without A’s labour, perhaps in designing and erecting the advertisement, the
contribution of B’s involuntary attention would have not produced anything. Therefore,
A does not owe B the whole product. Instead, the amount owed is greater than none of
the product (because B’s attention is a production factor), and less than all of the product
(because A’s labour is essential). Where the level is set within this range depends upon
the relative productivity of the two contributing factors (and others, such as natural re-
sources) — it must be settled case-by-case where this balance lies. This reasoning should
be used in carefully setting the level of compensation owed in the one-to-many basic in-
come case, such that A retains the fruit of their labour, and the liberty denied of all people
is fairly recompensed.
A potential objection to the basic income argument is that the liberty to direct
one’s attention has been shown, but it has not been shown that this liberty is one which
extends to public spaces. A liberty to be nakedmight be argued for, yet this does not imply
that such a liberty extends to public places. This objection usefully claries the impor-
tance of the liberty to direct one’s own attention. As argued in 3, the ability to direct one’s
own attention is a prerequisite for other liberties such as freedom of speech. Freedom of
speech certainly extends to public places, and so the denial of the liberty to voluntarily
direct one’s attention extends to public places too.
Throughout this essay, I have restricted claims about compensation for atten-
tional liberty lost to cases where attention is drawn involuntarily as a production factor. I
have thus far focused on attention used as a production factor as it is the most egregious
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case, because it breaks the Kantian ends-means injunction. However, the liberty to di-
rect one’s attention seems to be denied in cases where attention is drawn even without
being a production factor. A worry arises that, if we expand the scope to all instances
where attention is drawn involuntarily, there will be a massive proliferation of compen-
sation owed. For example, if I plant some brightly coloured owers in my garden, vis-
ible from the public street, these might involuntarily attract the attention of a passing
pedestrian. That attention is not used as a production factor in anything, and I gain noth-
ing. Yet I have still denied the pedestrian, momentarily, the ability to direct a portion
of their attention. In response to this, it rst should be noted that the vast majority of
attention-drawing instances in the mass proliferation case will be extremely minor, such
as this owers example. Advertisements, on the other hand, are engineered to be maxi-
mally attention-grabbing. Thus the compensation owedwill be a great deal lower inmost
attention-drawing instances where attention is not used as a production factor – so low,
that we need not worry about fullling them. Additionally, due to the massive quantity
of these generated, they will largely cancel out — I will owe you a miniscule amount, and
you will owe me a miniscule amount, so in sum we owe each other virtually nothing.
I have responded to most of the unexpected obligations generated by mass pro-
liferation, where small amounts of attention are drawn. But what of cases where large
amounts of attention are drawn, yet we attract the person’s attention for their own sake,
satisfying the Kantian ends-means injunction? Most of these interactions take place in
established relationships, because most people perform most of their interactions with
people with whom they have an existing social connection. For example, my friend is
visiting, and reading a book, and I bring them a delicious-smelling plate of curry. I have
involuntarily drawn their attention, because the brain automatically directs attention to-
wards newly perceived strong smells. Note that my friendmay then voluntarily maintain
their attention on the pleasant smell — yet, using the psychological denition of involun-
tary attention as “processes of attending that are not elicited by intentions but by certain
outside events”10, the initial attentional shi from the book to the curry smell is elicited by
an outside event, the curry’s arrival, so is classed as an involuntary drawing of attention.
However, I argue that no compensation is owed, because by entering a friendship, an im-
plicit contract is made to selectively forgo certain liberties with respect to one another.
My friend has agreed to forgo the liberty of directing their own attention at all timeswhen
I am around.
What, then, of cases where the liberty to direct your own attention is denied, sat-
isfying the ends-means injunction, but by someone with whom you have no pre-existing
social agreement? For example, a stranger sees you stepping onto the road and shouts
“watch out!” to warn you of an oncoming car. They have involuntarily drawn your at-
tention, but for your own sake. In cases like this example, we might want to argue that
you would have certainly consented to having your attention involuntarily drawn by the
stranger, but there was no time for them to obtain your consent in advance.11 However,
allowing a person’s liberties to be denied by others because we expect they would con-
sent to such a denial generates potentially undesirable consequences. I suspect that the
10Eimer, Nattkemper, Schröger, Prinz, 155.
11Indeed, it might be dicult to obtain your consent without drawing your attention. This argument could arguably be extended by
noting that the stranger is protecting your other liberties, such as the right to life, so denying the liberty to direct your own attention
is worthwhile.
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le libertarian would be suspicious of this line of reasoning, as it could be employed to
justify paternalistic state action which breaches citizens’ liberties. Further investigation
is required here, going beyond the scope of this essay. Therefore, I restrict my argument
for a tax on attentional liberty lost to cases where the attention is used as a production
factor — the Kantian ends-means injunction is broken, and so there is strong justication
for compensation being owed.
6 Conclusion
This essay has argued that, on a le libertarian account of distributive justice, we each
have the liberty to direct our own attention. Some modern work, such as advertising,
denies us this liberty by drawing our attention involuntarily, and uses this as a production
factor. Therefore, those denied liberty in these cases are owed compensation – part of
the product of the work should be paid to them. I then extended this argument to argue
that such work, when situated in public, denies all people the liberty to enter that space
without having their attention involuntarily drawn, and so compensation is owed to all –
paid in the form of a universal basic income.
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